>> the outgoing secretary has made a suggestion to introduce this. a huge compilation and an outcry among the veterans. people that are just, you know, playing or tapping code, they should get a medal that is higher than the purple heart and chuck hagel is a veteran himself. so the point is that it is a means to talk about this, which they are doing and we have to respect the people who are experiencing mass. >> you get the last word because we are right up against the time. so it must be a brief last words so we have not unilaterally disarm the weapons to kind of begin this and it will mark a

milestone in this range. so at the end of the day, in the same way that we came very close to a nuclear holocaust in 1963. ..

thank you for coming. [applause] two unarmed b-52 bombers flu over china sea without informing beijing on tuesday defying the declaration of a new air space defense zone in the region. they well, i knew that the department of deafen has commented on that specifically, which happened, i believe just earlier today. there was also reports, which this is all related. let me speak to these about the

november 23rd announcement that china has established in east china sea air deafen identification zone. action appear to be an attempt change the status quo in the east china sea. confrontation and accidents. we have made this case to china assistant secretary raised u.s. concerns with the ambassador on november 23rd. the ambassador also rewe are rated our concern in beijing and urged chinese to exercise caution and restraint. we're consulting with japan and other affabilitied party throughout the region in response to these announcements. >> reporter: it need to be resolve diplomatically. as for the u.s. intervening this way. isn't it inflammation and increasing tension? >> well, we we are continuing to

encourage our partner. one thing, actually, let me say on this. we don't -- we did -- we don't support efforts by any state to apply its air defense identification zone. not intending to enter the naicialt air space. we don't apply. the united doesn't apply that procedure to foreign aircraft. t one we don't think others should apply. we have long talked about concerns about increasing tensions or the raising of texs and the impacts that would have. at this point, our role is to continue to encourage both sides to move forward. it's a case we have done here. our position on the island that this impacts, of course, has not changed. >> reporter: but the u.s. recognizes that japan for all

intents and purposes does have control over the -- [inaudible] is the u.s. concerned about declaring if this zone over the weekend that china is trying to drag washington in to this, and washington may have taken the bait? >> i don't think there's been any bait taken. we have expressed our concerns. and obviously we have a wide ranging relationship with china. when there are concerns that need to express. we're not shy about expressing them. i just conveyed our view that this -- we view it as an attempt change the status quo in the east china sea. we expressed our concerns directly to the chinese as needed. so you're familiar with our position it. it's long standing. we don't take a position on the question of sovereignty. that hasn't changed. we have long expressed concerns about efforts to raise tensions

and this is evidence of our willingness to express -- >> can the u.s. -- >> coming back to this question. the flights were absolutely necessary? they shouldn't be viewed as a counter provocation? >> again, i don't have any specific comment on them. the department of defense commented on them. obviously, we'll look more closely at action z as they continue. >> you consider this a similar type of aca to what china has done in the past 18 months or so around -- >> i don't want to compare it to any past incident. ic i have express what we done and continue to monitor day by day. and a reminder you can watch all of our programs at c-span.org.

coming up on the next washington journal, aviation reporter for "usa today" take the effect of airline merger. head together thanksgiving holiday and the expansion of passenger rail. up next a conversation on defense policy. topics include the recent nuclear deal with iran, budget negotiations in congress, and the upcoming withdrawal from afghanistan. this is an hour and 20 minutes.

[inaudible conversations] >> thank you all for coming, and i'm sorry i'm not nick but here i am. i'm pulling myself together here. so i'm going just briefly introduce michelle and philip. i see a number of people in the audience we were throughout considerably better weather last summer. so michelle is the senior adviser at the boston consulting group from 2009 to 2012. she was undersecretary of deference of policy. and she was the principle adviser to secretary of defense in the formulation of national security defense policy and oversight of military plan and operations and so forth. i interviewed her a number of times. she was very cautious. we knew she knew a lot. she never told us very much. she's also a senior fellow at harvard center for science international affair, member of defense policy board.

cofounded the center for new america securities. a think tank you know. she's a member of the aspen strategy group. the dean leading the graduate school of art and sciences. he started as a child getting to arguments. i love that. [laughter] i'm going put that in my résume. i like that. soon thereafter he became a trial lawyer doing criminal justice and civil rights work. there's so much more here. he was an adviser to secretary of state condolezza rice. he's a member of the president's intelligence advisory board, he for president bush and president obama. he's written a number of books. germany -- i read that one. that was he wrote it with con i

did rice. and most importantly a member of the aspen strategy group. which she directed from 2002 to 2003. so i will start by asking both michelle and philip a few questions then open it up to the audience. we are in a transitional period for american defense strategy. are there lessons that as we're in a build down that we talked about last summer of the pentagon. are there lessons in earlier periods in american history that could help guide us now? i guess why don't you both answer that question? >> good afternoon, everybody. it's wonderful to see so many familiar faces around the table. i do think there are some lessons to be learned from our history in terms of periods like this where we are coming out of a period of war.

a decade -- more than a decade of war. and we are facing very severe budget pressures on the defense budget. and there are two lessons that come to mind. the first is a strategic lesson. and that is, when america comes out of a period of war, we typically are very templed to turn inward. to allow the sort of eyelationist impulses that have m coand gone throughout our history to assert themselves quite powerfully. yet, when i look out at the world with, you know, fundamentally fundamental changes happen with new powers rising. changes in the new blap of power from asia to the middle east, turmoil in the middle east, continued challenges of terrorism, proliferation, all kinds of changes. very dynamic, involve volatile environment. and a set of problems for which

it's difficult to imagine solution without someone cat losing an international response. to me, you know, we can't lose sight of the fact that we are a global power with global interest. that american prosperity and security depend on staying engaged in the world and on shaping events that happen far from our shores. we also have i think still a unique role to play in cat losing international action to deal with challenges that we face. so the first lesson is we need resist that temptation to turn inward and away from the world. yes, we have to focus on getting our economic house in order and pushing our domestic agenda forward. but we also have to stay engaged in the world to ensure our own prosperity and security in the future. the second lesson is more tactical. and that is as we have come out of wars in the past, typically

the defense budget goes through a draw down and we try to balance too much of the budget on the back of the horse. and end up with hollow force. we cut readiness and modernization, disproportionately. we end up with a force that looks good on paper but does not have the capability it needs. and so i look at the period we're in now particularly with the straitjacket of sequestration and the inflexibility of these across the board mandated cuts, i'm very worried that we are about to repeat that mistake. because we're not able to manage the draw down in a smart way we should inspect my view we need to putting more emphasis of pulling resources out of an inefficient and too large defense comprise. and try to maintain and protect readiness and modernization for

the future where we can. >> so my paper beginses with a paragraph that actually i would like to go over with some care because it's very historically oriented. and i start with the set of four assertions. all of which are paradox. the first assertion is despite constant headlines about troubles in the world, the country is remarkably safe and secure at the moment. assertion number two, but american levels of defense spending are nonetheless still at near historic highs. measured in constant dollars in various ways i get in to the paper. even accounted for projected cuts including l lev level of

spending and vision by sequestration. the method by which they are effective. yet third these expenditures are poorly allocated. and the inefficiency is likely to get much worse that is inefficiency in the sen of expenditures that are actually not relevant to producing effects that change or effect the material conditions we care mo about in the world. therefore, fourth, high spending in a period of low threat is buying less and less meaningful defense for situations. not so far in the future that could be more threatening than they are right now. so i call attention in the paper -- i offer a theory of inthrow i in the defense. a term borrowed from classic

call minutes of having to do with the degenerating amount of energy put to useful effect. and part of the argument there is larger and larger parts of the defense budget are actually devoted to things that are not really related very much to national defense. though of course national defense are all over the talking points used to defend the programs on any number of indications. and so actually you saw this right after 9/11 where actually throughout the 1990s, the defense establishment had become less and less relevant to the way the world was changing. and then after 9/11, huge adjustments had to be made. these were mostly bolted on top with marginal additional increase in spending on top of the fixed base. in order to go on new capabilities sort of basically trapped in an ad hoc way on to the old established capabilities.

that now in turn also become part of the fixed base. and are now being cut in the odd and efficient ways that michelle properly decries. so you have this phenomena of i get in to in the people. also make a conceptual argument about how can reorient defense strategy and actually our whole defense posture is oriented almost the exact opposite from the way it should be. the fast requirements call for very high readiness forces ready for extremely high tempo operations. exhaustingly high tempo around the clock, 24-hour hyper intense operations that probablies pass their decisive moment in the first days. won't be over but pass a decisive phase in the force day. the forces that need to be relevant need to be fairly close and i hadly ready.

though they need not be extremely great. and slow conflicts scenarios that can for which you can use forces that can be made available. slowly. for instance, many of the sorts of simplerring transnational conflicts which america might offer advice and assistance in different ways. from the observations i offer a number of particular suggestions some of them pretty radical that idealize possible core structures that i fear would be hard for the country to move to. there are historically reasons abunt history lessons. bun of them which was described in paper that mel wrote for thises aspen strategy group session which will be in the book. is that some of the most creative period in american defense planning and strategic adjust. occurring during periods of -- among the most for the l decades

in the history of the americaned armed forces were the 19 20s. not the 30s. not the interwar period as a whole but the 1920. they were not especially for the l or creative for the american army but highly important in create finished the navy, the marine corps., and the embryonic air corp. affiliate unlimited spending seemed to be -- and eisenhower spent much of the balance of the '50s trying to restrain the defense budget and force hard strategic choices that basically resulted in the development of the cold war deafen posture that then dominated the subsequent decades. in contrast, to say the year of

the '20s or the late '50s the 1990s i describe in my paper as having been the decade that the -- [inaudible] significant adjustments were not made. indeed the kind of military industrial complex that eisenhower warned about in 1961 really began to prove it strength and transaction after the cold war ended. as i've said did not much reorient a lot of foundation part of the establishment but instead drafted new piece on top of them that we're uneasily reckoning with now is that phase in our history seems to be coming to a close and a new chapter is beginning. >> okay.

thank you. >> i'm going to move ahead. because i think are you confidence that the obama administration in congress can agree on defense cuts? that do not impair significantly the ability of the united states to remain the world's dominant superpower? >> no. i think that there is an jot line of at least small budget deal to be had. when you talk to reasonable members of both parties in congress, there are still some that belong in the category. you can come up with some mechanisms for increasing revenue and some mechanisms for restraining the reducing entitlement costs. that could at least get us a

small budget dream for the next two three years. with some relief for, you know, avoid another round of sequestration and so forth. whether we can see our way through the political paralysis to get there is another question all together. i think that so, you know, by nature an optimist. time after time from the in position of sequestration. so i'm not confident at this point i think the conversation we need to be having is one of raising public awareness of some of the very real cos of sequestration on national deafen. i agree with philip that, you know, there's a lot it forces

you to cut the high e priority along with the lowest priorities. and so to me we've got to help people understand the damage to readiness already taking place. the ways in which we are breaking modernization programs fundamental to safe guarding american military superiority and ability to prevail in the future. we have to raise awarend of that. the old caucus in congress that used to national security issue is no longer. we have to start from scatch to have conversation and build support for a larger deal not only our own domestic but national security ground.

>> i agree with michelle. and no one is going to lose money betting against executive congressional cooperation. let think about pose you thought could be fixed. actually the basic processes conspire to make it very difficult to fix it the way we do strategy now. one reason this worked to some degree in the world car there was a broad degree of consensus over relatively stable objective we were working toward and then you had lot of arguments in the margins. that stable consensus what we're try do in national defense is pretty badly broken. without a clear vision to replace it, naturally then everyone basically defends their camp. so how are defense strategies devised now? in effect they are devised from

the bottom up in both the pentagon and congress in a sen. in the pentagon, requirements are generated through a process that michelle understands better than i do. i've tried. let me tell you by the time that process reach the level of, say, michelle, it's not fully. but t pretty substantially. it's not impossible for a gifted bureaucratic at michelle's level to intervene to move the process but it is challenging. a that point an lot of bargains have been struck and lot of things put in place. it gets hard even within the pentagon leadership to reorient the posture. meanwhile in the congress, a parallel process is happening depend originated in the congressional districts. and with constituents and constituent intercomprises and work the way through individual congressmen. so at the top levellet say we decry and absence of

leadership. suppose they want to exert leadership. i want you to see among the highly motivated. the system makes it extremely difficult to make strategic moves. i think, by the way, it's not impossible to beat this. if you had a high degree of clarity at the top and it was shared with key congressional leaders brought in a deep way the strategic contemplation. perhaps occurred in recent years but i have not seen it. then working from the consensus backwards to drive your respective processes then maybe there's a chance. it you conclude there's not a chance they will win and

strategic adjustment will only incur by adding in further marginal spending on the top belle where frustrated by how much they spend for so little apparent effect. >> if i can jump in. i don't disagree with the notion that there's a lot of bureaucratic inertia that defines the requirements or sense the of strategy. i think i have seen occasions when top-down leadership and intervention has really shifted the course. i think we saw that with the development of the strategic guidance in 2012. where one the congress passed the budget control act of 2011, which cut $487 billion out of the defense department for the next ten years we had a fundamentally new resource

constraint and rather than just asking, you know, people who write strategy and department to go try to figure this out, the president actually said, you know, this requires some fundamental rethinking. we need to do this as a group of leaders. and so asked the secretary the chairman all the chief and the sf secretary the combat commanders to spend three multiple hour meetings in the cabinet room as a group. now check your parochial hat at the door to the extent t possible. but engaged with the leadership in an active way to recraft the strategy. and that strategy was helped articulate the re-- and the continued emphasis on protecting our interest in the middle east. it talked about taking risks in areas of, you know, on prolonged

counterinsurgency we were going reduce some of our ground forces coming out of the two wars. there were emphasizing partner engagement. protecting investment in critical areas from cyber to intelligence -- to special operations forces. there have just a whole range of priority that came out of the exercise. it of truly top down driven. it became the next round for the budget comprise. more than any other strategy i have seen and been through many -- i have the scar to show i have been through many qt rrk. that actually drove growth shift in the budget. maybe it exception that produced the leader. maybe it's possibly. what i didn't see that in-depth engagement of congressional leadership that you talked about

which i do agree is necessary to really rebuild a bipartisanship -- where we're try going with defense. i played no hand in crafting. i think it's an admirable document. and the real van of x amount of x billions of dollars against the nominal objective in the defense strategic guidance and form anest hate of apparent entry.

>> forgive me. actually the origin did happen. >> okay. [laughter] that's quite seriously. the origins of this move were in the spring of 2006. >> that's true. and the remember which was hotly criticized by many of the same people participating in today's debate. it's worth keep in mind. in the spring of 2006 the big move was united offer to initiate with with no preconditions negotiations with the islamic republican of iran. even while iranian operatives were killing americans in iraq and so on. and they did that in a p5+1 process. because of that move, which the iranians substantialed spurned. the united states was able to get the foundational u.n. security counsel resolutions

that was the premise for everything that happened in the last seven and a half year. everyone told us we could not get in the beginning of '06 and then the building framework for the global coalition that, by the way, is an astonishing bipartisan diplomatic achievement. in '06 carried forward with great effect by the obama administration. if you think about the global colittle that crippled the iranian economy and the geopolitical cig can of that coalition, and that coalition been created and endured for seven and a half years, to the reach to the present moment. that's an extraordinary bipartisan accomplishment i think received very little notice and many of the critics today were the critics of the national move in the spring of '06. and therefore wort while to remember how much bipartisan

work and work by professional bureaucrat has been involved erecting the coalition we have today as we contemplate what diplomacy we need to sustain it and sustain the momentum behind it. >> let me ask you okay let me ask you what do you make of the criticism today from democrats in congress chuck schumer and others. i'm professor in virginia. these things in washington often befuddle me. but the from the point of the view of israeli and saudi government, why should they say

so? i don't see anything in it for them for saying so. they have both side of the deal. they can denounce the deal the united states still has an important military relationship with the state of israel that are effectively in my view, unper teshed by this public crawl that will continue. including undertaking and understandings about what the united will do to protect our common security interest that might be threatened by iran nap are unaffected by the israeli denunciation of the diplomacy. which helps them at home and hedges against things that might go wrong in that diplomacy. and then i noticed a lot of people who are concerned about and negative about iran making at the same times that say i don't say i don't trust iran. and who does.

i notice very carefully when people say they support new sanctions but the sanctions will be held and they might put an us is sense they only go in to effect after the efforts to get a final deal to fail if you study what is involved in the interim measures. you'll see how much iran's good faith is going to be tested by all the activities they're going to be put in play under the interim measures. so indian the current debate. i view it somewhat philosophically. i think the real rift goo yo politically between the united government and some others is here. on this point. which is that the united states is currently demonstrating in

syria if it's wmd concerns can be settled effectively, that the united states will take military intervention and the conflict off the table. syria is becoming a test case for that proposition watch closely by everyone in the middle east including iran. in effect the same message is being communicated on iran. if you take the wmd concern settled take them effectively off the table and do so in a trust worthy way, we're prepared actually to come back to the international community and drop sanctions confidence that your own internal handicap limit your effectivenesses in that route. in that geopolitical point, i think there may be some disagreements with some of our friends in israel and saudi arabia.

the sanks regime is extremely stable and relied upon to remain durable regardless what happened in the diplomacy. i don't share that. i believe the obama administration spurned a deal like the one they accepted it would be difficult to hold the sanctions regime together. and then as the sanction regime begins to collapse, options will narrow and find ourselves on a path which the option of war become increasingly evidence. and, by the way, i think some of the others involved in this debate have perfectly well analyzed this dynamic. and have come to their positions

accordingly. let me add what has been agreed in geneva is a first step and first step only. it's not a comprehensive deal and should not be judged of such. they're not continuing to make progress in the nuclear program. they're not, you know, charging ahead in and amassing more enriched material in building plutonium reactor and so forth. it was designed to halt and in some areas like the 20% enriched uranium roll back the program and put some time on the clock. i think it's also, as philip

said, i think taking the first step and willing to negotiate is absolutely essential to maintaining the internet the unity of the international community to uphold sagests and to keep the pressure on. if the united states appeared simply unwilling to take the diplomatic route seriously, it's a "fantasy" to think we could maintain the sanctions regime we carefully and successfully constructed. in my view whether or not we get a good deal. it's still possible but unknown. and we will see over the next six months in what i anticipate will be tough negotiations. and that those negotiations whrb helped, in my view, by the continued threat of making the sanctions regime even more

punishing if negotiations fail. and by keeping all options including military options on the table. that threat of cohearsive measures needs to be clearly in iran's mind to continue to get them to be serious at the negotiating table. the very minimal relief that has been provided. the $6 to $7 billion of access to frozen assets ask not breaking the sanctions regime. it is not the financial sanctions, the oil sageses that have brought the iranian economy to where it is today remain in place. people have to understand that. i do think that there is concern in the region about a u.s./iron

deal or p5+1 iran deal that would

in new york saying that two b25 bombers flown over the show of force. i would like to ask you both about that. >> my understanding is that the b-52 flight were part of a plan to exercise on the u.s. and make clear it was not going to comply with the new kind of rules and regulations that china had asserted with regard to this declared zone. danger of miscalculation with regard to military activities in and around china it is the air.

when the u.s. has, you know, been patrolling an arable air waives. they have scrambled and some cases operated in a very aggressive marijuana manner that increase the risk of accident. my worry if you have chinese fighters scrambling and consistently intercepting japanese or korean or ore aircraft, in any kind of aggressive or assertive way, you are by definition increasing the risk of someone being too much of a hot dog. someone not being safe.

not did escalating them in this manner. >> okay. let me move on to the last question then open to the audience. about the in the strategy in the middle east and asia. should the united states slowly decrease its commitment in the middle east as people have suggested and at the same time enhance or increase the commitment in asia as part of the so-called pivot? i'm firm believer in the rebalance meaning as we have relatively more bandwidth available coming out to long ground wars in the middle east and south asia, you know, we need to pay more attention to the asia-pacific because it is

region that will most effect our prosperity and security long-term. but that does not mean we take our eye off the middle east. it doesn't mean that we abandon our partners and allies there. the united states has long before a power able to walk and chew gum at the same time. we have vital interest in the middle east even as our own energy picture at home changes. it was a relative increase in our attention to asia and to the changes that are happening there. adapting our posture to those changes while we stay engaged in a key region like the middle east.

obviously we came out of iraq as we are reducing our posture in afghanistan as we come toward 2014. the number of ground forces in the region is going to be changing. but our air and navel presence are engagement with our partners and allies are commitments to those key countries should not and i don't believe it. they will not change in my expectations. it's worth getting in to a little bit what are the conflict scenarios in either of the middle east or east asia. and what is the relation of american defense posture to those scenarios? so in the middle east and east asia, for instance, i've concluded that i do not believe that the united states needs to prepare itself to conquer, occupy, and hold large land areas. that does not mean it may not need to have military

capabilities. but the notion that the united states would prepare for a land innovation of china and holding large territory in china as a serious military scenario. now nor i do believe, by the way, that the united states need plan to conquer, occupy, and hold north korea. even in the event of a korea war. even in the event of a war with iran. i know, it's seems scary to even talk about these contingencies, but decisions involving many billions of dollars will come from talking about contingencies. so so you to think about what it is we want to be able to do and don't need to be able to do. at least not quickly. what do we need to be to be do

quickly? the middle east or east asia? we need to be formable sea and air that can deter and defeat rapidly any potential opponent largely with forces on hand or available within hours. small fraction are to be meet the readiness requirement either in the navy or air force in the middle east and east asia. from a larger or smaller overall force structure.

for example when japan was cob templating the war plans in 1941 they looked around and said if we wanted war against the american british alliance. we need to hit three spots. knock out those three and you have knocked out effective military operation in the asia-pacific region. now pearl harbor was a stretch. they pulled it off. you can see when you narrow it down to that. when you are basing infrastructure and overseas presence is remarkably slender concentrated on one or two key assets. that's actually not a stable position for a conflict in which maximum readiness is ever more at the premium. >> okay. yeah. great. put your name tag side way. i guess i'll start other here.

>> guy swan. retired u.s. army. it would appear in today's paper that we're reliving the lessons of iraq as we try to negotiate a withdrail from and follow on force in afghanistan. some of us that participated in some of that with the the mall key government are kind of seeing this happen again. what years old advice be to the administration on dealing with the karzai government as z we're go forward to 2014? >> patience. [laughter] this is mad. ing. but, you know, i think the important thing is to focus on what is in the u.s. strategic interest? i think a long-term strategic

partnership that supports the afghan state and afghan institutions gaining self-sufficientty, inexpense, capacity, is in our interest nor all the reason we live through on 9/11. i think it can be done at the reasonable level of investment. and, you know, i believe and i share the view that if we're going to have i think we heard from the afghan people that most of afghan's leadership and including old say just about if

not every presidential candidate that is running for election early next year wants u.s. and the international community to stay. i would hope even if karzai persists in his we would seek to maintain some flexible to work with a new government to quickly put a framework in place to allow what is in the strategic interest of both countries which is a modest continued presence of and for assistance to allow that to happen.

[inaudible] indian quite well t going to be more focused. [inaudible] do you think that nato needs to be transformed. when i say transformed i say transformed -- [inaudible] if that is the case from your point of view the role of the united states -- [inaudible] i do think nato remains extremely important and relevant for the united states. it is the first place we turn to

for allies and partners and anything we not only in europe but anywhere in the world. my big e concern in the declining investment within nato in defense and national security capabilities. and, you know, and so i do think the alliance needs to think about how will we sustain a reasonable level of investment in our capabilities for the future at the time when that's not popular for many inside europe. and how do we get more bang for the buck or more bang from the your rewe invest in term of greater codevelopment, sharing, pooling of resources to develop

reshapes defense under budget pressure, simply -- you will sub optimize what the alliance of the whole have available. we have got have a more coherent picture of the capabilities the alliance needs across the board. be able to afford every capability. >> nato is a creature of member governments. it is not merely a i have l because both adds enabling capability and synergies beyond what any of them can do alone or without prior planning. and i agree with michelle's observation. but fundamentally it comes back to what are the member governments care about? if they adopt care about asia and what is happening in a lot of countries, meetings in

brussels are not going to make them care. it has to deal with the role see for helps in the world and the way think think the world thought ourself for common security. for example, we talk about my paper i talk about there are some areas of extremely high readiness where they think they can make the contribution for a defense purpose they can share. you can try to notice those and analyze those. including in the european mediterranean region or the persian gulf. there are capabilities that need to gather slowly. nato focused on afghanistan. i think we are very early in drawing the lessons from

afghanistan that question use in mali, in nigeria, in yem yemen, somalia. countries are the mix are not just the united and vary quite a lot. common learning how do we give advice and support. a lot in areas that involve security but not uniformed military forces. frankly i think we are slow in learning thely son of bitter experience in afghanistan and iraq and thinking about advise and assist capability that we need for the future in some ways we have made more headway in learn lessons from experiences in latin america. those are not as well digested. this question for michelle. it was said at the beginning of

the second term that chuck hagel was selected as defense secretary and you were not, in part, at least because there was this view of the president and the administration as perceived. or as hagel seen as a of different view. is this accurate? and what happened in the ensuing months in term where they have gone on policy from iran to afghanistan as discussing. does that in fact reflect this far more diplomatic and military approach? i don't have a window in to the

president's decision making, but i your explanation does not ring true to my ears. i think chuck has been a close associate of president obama since their time in the senate. he served on the president's intelligence advisory board. i think there was a lot of discussion in the first term about finding a place for chuck hagel in the president's cabinet. i think that discussion was naturally renewed when there was an opportunity to bring new people to the cabinet in the second term. i think that is the president's friendship and republican for chuck hagel is what drove the decision more than anything else. at least i'm not aware of any other factors in that. >> well, if i can quickly followup. [laughter] does the posture in the

administration in term of -- concern you at all? i'm a proponent of having a strong military stument to support our foreign policy goals. i think during a period of war because you have tens of thousands of americans in harm's way on the ground, the voice of the department of defense in foreign policy decision making naturally becomes louder relative to times of peace when you don't have many americans in uniform in harm's way. i think that is appropriate. it's important it be heard when so much of the risk at stake in human terms.

leaders in uniform would agree that the military voice would not dominate the circle. it needs to be heard and informing the debate. the president has no problem hearing dissending view. in fact, you know, to the person scowling in the back row, you will be called on and asked if you have a dissending view if you look like you have one. it's a president who seeks out the full rage of views because he believes he makes better decisions that way. again, i think that, you know, dod has an important voice in those directions. i don't know who believes it should be the dominant voice under any circumstance including

me. [inaudible] a two-part question for fill. just to followup on your point about expanding not contracting the u.s. global basing structure. the strategic logic to that is very compelling. talk about the politics and policy dimension of that. obviously they don't have a headquarter in africa because it's hard to find a stable democratic government host that headquarter. our policy toward bahrain is obviously influenced by the presence of the fifth fleet. other than the expansion of military presence in australia, how would you work the global politics of that? but a second question would be how do you describe the strategic environment of the next, you know, 10 to 20 years.

we have gone through a bipolar cold war to a unit polar moment. are we back to now what i think samuel described as unit -- multipolar environment reconfront in the next -- driven question areas where you think you need -- those are principally the middle east and east asia. so then you want to look very hard at all of your basing options in those two regions. without going country by country and island by island. what i can say is this. you look at do people in your

region want your help? do they think it is in your interest to have powerful, highly capable forces nearby in order to provide them with the measure of security they think they need in partnership with you. if the an to that is yes, opportunities begin to arise. for all kinds of discussions that then can evolve over time and different configurations and different ways. again, the united is not going to be helping to provide additional security in regions where no one want america's help. but i don't think that's the case for the two regions i mentioned for if the second part of your question, actually has much to do with the concept what does it mean when you talk about defense slowing. i think the dominant problems, actually, the dominant issue in this phase of world history are increasingly transnational in characteristic rather than international.

that is defined less by blogs of power as they were over much of the lass three and a half centuries. and define more by issues that actually cut as cross societies and are not easily categorized as either foreign or domestic or present a domestic face to the people in the countries. against many of the kinds of problems. transnational crime whether it's cross-border crime that is killing thousands in mexico. or transnational terrorism that is killing hundreds in afghanistan. those sort of trans-- that can be generated slowly and patiently over time. it's a different kind of structure with different kinds of needs for overseas presence and political relationships.

rebalancing within asia are being concentrated in the northeast is covering through the southeast asia. it is things like agreed access agreements. use of joint facilities, planned bilateral and multilateral exercise increasing the tempo of our interaction, our partner capacity building and so forth. the only measure should not be permanent basis. it's really the work that we're doing and the rotational base of forces that are, you know, passing through a region bolstering deterrence, reassuring allies and so forth.

>> we have about ten minute left. what i'm going do is take the next -- get everybody in i have groups of questions. let me hear from gourden adams. thank you. i think a fundamental one is increasingly curious about the budgets in planning and planning in budgets. i'm wondering if where with are is taking both of these fully no to account in a context of a new world. what, i mean, is specifically to what we've been talking about. whether a safer -- i would like phil to talk about a safer and more secure wonder for the united states that he describes is consistent with

what seems to be a relatively agrassive forward-leadings. ture -- aggressive forward-leading posture. i'm curious about language in terms of planning general national security planning. it's not collar how rueful it is either in providing a guideline for policy and budgets or whether it's a realistic capacity that the united states has via the other region of the world and the new world. readiness for what? they slightly address and like

to ask michelle. [inaudible] yesterday i was a meeting in csis and one of the comments made was when we have a state department plan and defense department plan, how do we gate national plan. that's sort of the first question. i want to build on what gordon said about language. i was talking about a month ago about a retired navy admiral and asked how you would change it and he said language matters. in the navy we man the ships. you start with a ships and then you figure out what you might do with them. i'm passing that on. >> yes. my question is spes thinkty on

some of the comments you have opened with. michelle, how do you avoid a hollow force? what major program you don't need a long range strategic bomber or only need two leg of the nuclear tripod or go you avoid the hollow force and make the necessary -- i hate to use the word -- where i came from a reduction in planned future increasing in spending is not a -- [inaudible] and then, philip, aside from reading between the lines it seems you want to abolish the army. could you be a little bit more specific how you get from here to there. the changes other than the basing and the two different type of readiness. what does it mean in term of the structure? what role is there for the army and the kind of rapid response

force projection scenario? >> if i can -- to make sure you keep your answers -- we have four more people in five minutes. [laughter] thanks. otherwise the agencies ron their own. i'm siting and i never saw a better model than to do national planning cobbling together from the different 's. i learned at his knee when i was just out of brichs to adams readiness for what. the united states record in predicting where and what wars it will fight five or even ten years and sometimes even one year ahead of time is terrible. nearly zero. you to have a certain

flexibility in what you're preparing for. that said, not all regions of the world are of equal concern. then the safer world and the reason that's consistent with the kind of budget approach i'm talking about i'm imagining, of course, there's more reassuring because it's readier though the overall structure is small. insed of having to generate ten times the force so one tenth is available on station. i'm also imagining a world in which you invest in your strategy while times are safe so you are readier and have a more useful structure when times are not safe. uttered by secretary of

deference literally standing in the very throbbing beating heart of the u.s. army the united states military academied at west point in 2011. and if you go through my paper, i make some arguments about in effect the logical implications of gate's. >> it means all things to all people. most important element are deterring adversary from mischief or atbretion. reassuring allies to our commitment to them. and working with allies and partners to build their capacity to contribute to regional and international security. i agree with a lot of phil's comments for readiness for what. we can't predict specific but i think the mission of the

military has been consistent. on down the list. that's just a sampling. his point about again i agree with the importance of thinking whole of government or from a national strategic basis when we plan, i think the one practical wrench i'll throw in the work you have gross resource imbalances between agencies. a colleague of mine used to say you have a defense department on steroids. at least it used to be. defense department on steroids and state and aide on life support. you get the -- you may have a beautifully inte dwraited plan at conception. when it goes up the hill to be resourced and you get a third of the resources you asked for on the civilian side and 110% of the resources on the military side. it doesn't look so integrated or

coherent anymore. on a hallow force, i think there's a lot that kneads to -- needs to be done in the defense reform domain. taking down the 20% of infrastructure that our military leaders don't think they need anymore. ..

>> i want to pursue your historical analogy in the twenties and fifties as positive elements. you can find a negative as well leading to korea korea, vietnam, the hollow army, where i would go that would proded your conclusions when you come to the stakes the drawdown is higher, a budget scarcity forces raises and budget scarcity is critically important to get it right. if you agree with that, this is the question assertion assertion, is the most important step we can take no is to get some sort of

budget deal that we talked about at the beginning, not just the sequestered because there is a crazy year way to do budgeting, i am not aware but we need definitions in terms of budget planning. not just so the dod can plan before some hard choices because without the definition people will always think relief is over the next budget deal and the institution will be unwilling to make his choices. >> can i first say with that comment on afghanistan you are absolutely right to say that with beyond the frustrations to see what are the strategic interest. then breathed deeply and lower the shoulders. [laughter] then i think it will work.

a -- i was in the nato foreign ministers' meeting when the soviets never turned up then the soviet ambassador says i have been important announcement that the soviet union no longer exist. we will continue to be surprised to prepare the unexpected is tremendously difficult to go to congress or parliament to ask for money when you don't know what your asking for. we see this over and over. there is of some the meeting scheduled that we will just be coming out from afghanistan most of us with

troops remaining and the u.s. at that time was ready to play a leadership role in trying to shape what is next. i don't think the europeans can do that. , so the comment on that is interesting and finally much talk about the middle east and asia for very reason. there was a speech made about the arctic strategy the other day. it would be interesting to hear your comments. thank you. >> john? >> i would like to bring the united nations in to do this. when i was ambassador to the un and predawn the situation of sierra leone it was a total basket case the only

controls one small century in the middle of the country's capital and criminals of all kind controlled the rest of the country. within several years time u.s. long dash two and peacekeeping force reestablish control of the entire country. there are other good examples of effected united nations actions liberia among others. then recently we hear about this intervention of the eastern kondo which is a force that that is more than a peacekeeping mandate but peace enforcing. and always with the court -- bush 43 of ministration there is condescension to the capability in utility of the u.n. although i noted that mr. rumsfeld as he thought how do we get out of this heavy stuff may be capacitate un peacekeeping

forces may not be a bad thing. that cost a fraction of what it cost to deploy a u.s. force we pay $0.26 on the dollar not to mention the differential between the cost of fielding the un force and the american force it is in order of magnitude at least if not more. my question would be how much time do we or should we spend to try to factor in and institutions like the united nations into our defense posture? or how much do we think about outsourcing? >> the last question. >> it seems if we discuss the future of american defense we would give thought to the future of the american relationship with china. i am wondering if you see

china as a potential ally with cooperation becomes normal zero or as a rival against whom the u.s. has a position one way or another? >> i will not try to comment on everything that was said or just agree with bill and what he noted i know very little about secretary hegel's strategy. [laughter] but i simply want to endorse john negroponte each basic thrust which is will get your institutional repertory and think of them as assets with the construction of a defense strategy especially the slow side of the defense strategy. but forced posture are much more complicated than that territorial concept that many people have in their head.

these institutions of many kinds are proving invaluable. we can think of two or three others that are doing some good work including the organization that right now that has the task to scoop nerve gas out of syria. but i did want to take a moment to comment on the geopolitical question about the defense towards china. to me, my answer is into simple parts. since the chinese leadership themselves don't know how their country will involve how could i possibly? [laughter] day argue among themselves as to what kind of country they ought to have or what foreign policy they ought to have a and what attitude to the outside world they should have been that is the unsettled argument inside china.

that is point number one. point number two, since the united states does care of little bit how that argument comes out so the question is if you care, then what are the policies that are most likely to produce victory for the sites you find more sympathetic? that seems to be an approach that says we want to welcome china into sharing global responsibilities not containing or excluding. this has been the view that others have articulated for some time. there for the argument is by giving them the chance to participate, by giving them a sense to be a stakeholder you don't ensure that china will not become something dangerous in you have to do things that hedge against the danger but you reduced the likelihood and promote that likelihood and the factions that favor a

different kind of approach as they themselves were struggling to come to grips with a very new world horizon than what they grew up with. >> i would just add it is the most important strategic question we will face in the coming decade. there are currently cooperative than competitive elements and we need to try not only to support china becoming more of a stakeholder globally but incentivize them so whenever there is a choice between a more cooperative path they see it in their self-interest to do that whether economic or their standing in the world their ability to influence. that said i do think we have to have a head in the

strategy against the possibility that china may choose to compete or use military force to pursue its interests in the future to make sure we have a military that can operate effectively in the face of that. we want to do that in the a way that does not feel the more competitive dimension and that is tough line nine and the essence of the strategy that has to be done. i wholeheartedly share your thoughts u.s. will come to this summit in 2014 with leadership vision where the alliance needs to go post 2014. i think this challenge ... our days is broader than to as we think about how do we insure this is a period of

innovation and strategic repositioning for the military as opposed for a time of declined that we brought in an hour-- and in some ways change the way we operate to incentivize or thinking new or differently than the very well-worn path we have spent on over the last decade. i could go on with the wind and i agree. so i will keep it short and stop there. >> this is a great discussion and we're only 10 minutes over. thank you

>> the pat nixon rose garden because she was instrumental to designing in the nixon library opening in 1980. she had an affinity for roses and was instrumental to open the white house for garden chores in the spring which is a tradition that has continued to this day. this rose developed in 1972 by a french designer when mrs. nixon was the first lady the only rose that will

continue to grow at the white house. the final resting place of the president can mrs. nixon from his humble farm house. a great story behind the epitaph on mrs. nixon's memorial site that she chose herself. she wanted to meet the people that were affected by this devastating earthquake one of the reporters said mrs. nixon what good will any of this do if the people you're speaking to cannot understand we were saying? she replied even with people cannot speak your language they can tell if you have love in your heart. now you can .

>> "washington j >> host: i am joint now from the brookings institution and from the heritage foundation rehab thef discussion of the state of poverty in america. starting first with you recent census figures shown an one of six are in poverty. what does that mean? >> guest: the average listener when they hear the word poverty think of people that experienced significant material deprivation. typically of one of six americans then flash to a homeless family. the reality is of those one out of six roughly 46 million americans who were labeled as pork, only about 1% are homeless at any given point in time. close at 50% of all four families own their own homes

which is typically the three-bedroom house with 1.five past. the typical poor family according to the census own numbers lives in a perfectly large house in good repair about 80 percent of air-conditioning, two-thirds have cable or satellite half. of them have a computer or internet access about the one-third have wide-screen hdtv if you ask him duringundr the course of the year were your children even hungry for a single day 96 percent will say no.da for out of five for adults will say they were notduri hungry for a single moment. that does not mean they are now struggling, they have to ver work very hard to make ends meet but the normal picture of deprivation of not having food on the table. the roof

or a family -- homeless family in the back of a van, that has nothing to do with poverty as the government explains it. how does the government defined poverty? below it is to say anyone a certain income level that was arrived at by looking at the cost of the basic food budget, and then adding a little more for shelter, clothes, and other necessity. for a four person family, the poverty line is around $22,000 per year. a poor person family -- four person family is expected to have that much money to meet the basic needs. more than that, they are not poor. less than that, they are considered poor. one to bring you into the conversation. for democrats the number is (202) 737-000 (202) 737-0001

for republicans (202) 737-0002 independents (202) 628- 0205 poverty, wek about think about inner cities. where is poverty concentrated in the united states? it is more concentrated in the inner-city. while we have a picture about poverty and that this condition of extreme deprivation, and i do not want to suggest that those families and extreme it deprivation do not exist at all, that would be ridiculous, but to say they are one in six families in the united states is just wrong. they are a much smaller portion. one thing when the government goes to define poverty is is as a society we spent close to and

program foron on a low income americans. roughly one in three americans the anti-nefits from poverty system. the average cost is around 9000 dollars per recipient for 100 million ethiopians. when the government goes to count how much income household has, virtually none of that massive amounts of assistance, larger than the entire economy, none of that is counted as income. it is a very misleading depiction i believe. if i understand correctly, the obama administration rolled out a new way of measuring poverty. how is that different? i think it is an improvement, and what it does is if you include the non-cash youfits for the poor gets,

get a slightly different picture than you do if you just count cash income. away fromved very far providing people with what we used to call welfare or cash income towards providing for makingd support any assistance they get conditional on work. most of the assistance we get now, except for the disabled and a few other groups is conditioned out on work. i think that it's a really important for people to understand. poverty is in the eye of the beholder. say robert is suggesting there are not that many truly poor people in the united states. we are an affluent country after all. when you think about, could you live on $22,000 per year and

have to support a family of four? you have to define -- decide for yourself if it is a reasonable standard or not. $22,000 spent a lot differently here in washington than other places. there is some attempt to build in geographic variation in the new experimental measure that the admin -- administration is using now. it has not been traditionally the case we have done that. is blackaditionally across the board. i would argue the new measure is a better measure, because it is a race with a moving goal line. as soon as you get close to crossing the finish line, they move it back so you can never cross it. you can define poverty income level relative to the average standard of society.

ensure theod way to poor is always with you. if we were to get a magic wand and ways that at everyone's income and it doubled this evening thomas that would be a good thing, right cap go there is no reduction in poverty at all because the poverty income levels would also double. i think it is extraordinarily misleading and does not really get us closer to the truth. we want to know how many families are hungry. how many families are not nourished. how many live in housing that is really unhealthy. this does not answer that. we also need an honest count to understand how much people are really receiving government aid. if week spent close to $1 trillion on the year on

food,ing poor all, cash, and housing and convert that to cash, close to six times the amount needed to raise every families income above the poverty level, even if you just take the cash, food, and housing aid, more than twice what is needed to wipe out poverty in the u.s. peopled a lot more than realize, and effectively the government does not give the government credit for that. -- taxpayer credit for all of that. some of want to bring our viewers into the conversation now. first up, passed on the line for democrats. on the line for democrats. i was listening to your conversation about 23,000 dollars per year being poverty guidelines. i wonder where you feel where individuals say their social

security check or small retirement check is $600 per month as opposed to the amount you are thinking. where does that leave them? people struggle every day, and thathere are many people do not have housing, do not have medical and the other things that you just mentioned. your conversation sounded very rosy in cheerful, but that is not the way it really is. well, i think there are some people that do not have medical but we do spend close to half $1 trillion for year getting medical care to low income americans, and that does not include medicare so the elderly generally have medicare, and i am not saying there is no one out there who is not

struggling. in fact, i think most people are struggling day to day to make ends meet, but i am saying if you ask poor old were you hungry of any point during the year, four out of the five of them will say hungry -- they know, we were not hungry. >> if you asked them did you have a medical need you could not get attended to, almost all of them would say they do. most people have satellite, cable television. much differentis than you ordinarily see on the network news. not to say there are no families that really do face deprivation, but a much smaller number than the 46 million we usually hear as being in poverty. i think we have to recognize one of the reasons people are poor is because they have lost a job or cannot find

one. -- they might have television or an air- conditioning unit or what have movebecause you do not every month to fit what income is coming into the household. so a lot of what this is about this huge insecurity, not knowing where the next job will come from, how you are going to get one and if you're going occasionally when unemployment rates are very high, we have to focus on the fact that a lot of people are jobless, who would like to work, and they cannot find a full-time job, or a job that would enable them to support their family. guest: i would agree. the lack of jobs or insecurity is a bigger issue. it does not do you much good if

you have internet access, a computer, a television, and air- conditioning when you are worried about if you can keep those things. host: eight, ohio. j, on our line for democrats. line foron our democrats. caller: good morning. i am listening with disdain. for robert to say one in six without, hee going is completely out of touch. we just went through one of the greatest recessions since the great depression. we have one of the highest unemployment numbers we have seen in a long time, and right now, food bank shelves are empty because people are not getting enough money through snap to get their children said, their , theirs said --fed

families fed. i work with these people. robert needs to get in touch with a few of them. i am talking to people that have lost their jobs and have to pick between food and heating the house, and inhaler for their daughter, or putting food on the table, or paying the bills to make sure their lights stay on. it is a real problem in the united states. making additional cuts and allowing the snap program to expire was one of the worst things you could do with -- for these people, especially so close to the holiday season. look at walmart. they are having food drives for their own employees that can not afford to put food on the table. walmart sells food. their employees do not have enough money to buy the food.

every is a problem with the working poor. part of the solution is having a minimum wage inflation and does not stagnate for multiple years. we have to help americans and not make them feel criminalized because they are not making enough money. guest: well, it is simple for advocacy individuals such as that to say i have seen this, i have seen that. i have seen things, too, can information i am getting comes directly from the agriculture department, which runs these food programs, and they tell us when they are asking for people if they had enough food to eat, were you ever hungry, and 96% of them say our children were never hungry even for a single day, and 80% of adults were not hungry for a single day. i feel sorry for the 20% that

were hungry, but to shape a policy that meets real needs, we have to be honest about what is out there. i am not making these numbers up. they come from the agency that runs these food programs and spend a lot of money feeding poor people. to $9,000nding close for each person in the bottom third of the population. if we could spend close to $1 trillion a year on these individuals and still have massive numbers of people that do not have enough food to eat on a daily basis, that is a huge indictment of the welfare state beyond anything i could say. it is simply not true. we spent a lot of money, the money goes to assist the poor people, and we do a reasonable job with that, not a perfect job. i disagree that in the long these programs promote work. there are over 80 different

programs for poor people. only two of them have work requirements. we have to work toward a system that helps to give aid and requires more of the poor to help themselves in the long term. in "the newicle york times" writes about how the reduction in snap benefits has impacted more than 47 million people, the largest wholesale cut in the program since the act was first passed and it touches about one in seven americans. isabel sawhill, can you respond? guest: robert is calling on data that does exist, but he is only giving you part of the picture because a lot of the data shows that people are very food insecure. they might not be going to bed hungry, but they might be cutting back on what the adults eat themselves to keep food in

the mouths of the children. it is a much more mixed picture that i think you are getting from him. on food stamps, is one of our largest anti-poverty programs. it is the basic program that we used to put out the minimum floor under people's standard of living, and it was cut back on november 1. it had been bumped up as a result of the anti-recession program that was enacted to fight unemployment. it has now been brought back to where it was before, and i am not so concerned about these recent cuts that occurred in november, as i am about what is on the congressional agenda right now, which is a farm bill that would further reduce the safety net in america, and particularly the food stamp program. there is a huge difference between the senate and the

house. is verye bill restrictive. they will be a debate and i think there should be a debate about work requirements. in other words, do we require people to work in return for getting food stamps, especially if they are able-bodied and do not have children. theresue there is are jobs available, training programs available for those that cannot find jobs? we need to have that debate. until we have jobs and training programs, we should be very careful about imposing work requirements on families that do not have any other income. host: roy in kentucky on our line for republicans. caller: good morning, ma'am, good morning, ma'am, good morning, sir. about four food banks. i go to different states,

looking for jobs. there ain't no jobs in this country. obama care is so expensive i cannot hit obamacare, -- get to know,, and i want am i going to pay a fine, or wind up in jail? what can you all say about obama care? i think we should vote to impeach the president of the him, getates, impeach some new people in the white house and some new people in the congress. this is terrible. four food banks because you all want to cut food stamps. guest: while i sympathize and recognize the huge problem of the media time about a lack of jobs, the cut in the food stamps onetitutes a cut of about

, and i 1% of the cuts would be willing to exchange those for changes in the way the food stamp program and the welfare program works. americans believe that those that receive aid from the government should be willing to work or look for work. 80 programs assist poor people. only two of them require any type of work. sounds odd to be talking about requiring the work in a climate where there is a lack of jobs, but to put a work requirement in place takes many years to implement. if we start today, we could be talking 4, 5 years from now, for

example, in the food stamp program, taking the able-bodied adults, with no kids to support, requiring them to come to the .ffice one day a week when we did that in the 1990's, what we saw was a dramatic reduction in the number of people that needed aid, a huge surge in employment, and a reduction in poverty that was quite substantial. we need to follow that same progress with all of the welfare programs over the long term, not necessarily over the next 12 months. it takes a long time to change the welfare state. it is like a giant oil tanker. it does not turn on a dime. it is time to turn the system around so that it is not a handout, but gives aid to everyone who needs it, but expects everything -- something back in the -- in return.

guest: i think it is important to make it clear to your viewers here we are talking about. we are talking about programs for the disabled. are we going to expect them to work? we are talking about programs that serve the elderly, children, that help with aid to education, health care. you do not expect a child to go school isse their getting extra help because they are a poor child. i am in favor of work adults that are getting direct assistance that supports their income from the government. that does not mean we can have a work requirement for all of these programs. this is a set of programs that is not welfare. these programs support training, education, health care, social services, problems when children are neglected and abused -- we have to do those things in our society.

guest: clearly, we're not talking about making disabled people were, and when i talk about $1 trillion of aid, about half of that does go to disabled or elderly people who no reasonable person could expect to work, but the other half goes to families that contain someone that is capable of working, and when you are giving cash to those individuals when they are not working, we should be doing something to help them become more self-sufficient, and for the most part we do not do that in the welfare system. host: st. james city, florida. martin. independent. caller: i hear people touching on the real problem, but dancing around it. walmart is the most egregious employer in the country, and we have richard trumka, the most gutless leader in the history of

unions, who was never held a real job in his life. was told by his own committee to use small collectives to facilitate national healthcare. that means unions. if mr. richard trumka would approach everyone punching a cash register -- host: do you have a question about poverty? caller: yes, why not addressing that unions are being left by the website -- wayside? the real important issue is the deportation of illegal immigrants that have reduced our workplace economy by two thirds. as a 14-year-old child i beg to do the work that americans do not want to do, and i got paid three times the minimum wage. askingese liberals are to raise the minimum wage. you do not need to raise the minimal wage. you have to deport and get rid of the actual, literal slaves

that are being allowed into this country. guest: i agree with the caller that you illegal immigrants do push low skilled american of the labor market and they tend to push wages down. i do not think we should have 7 million illegal immigrants working in the u.s. economy when we have such a huge level of unemployment, legitimate immigrants and us-born citizens. i think jobs belong to u.s. citizens first, not to those that have come here and violated our borders. guest: as an economist that has looked at all of the literature on whether or not a legal immigrants reduce wages for americans, i do not see much evidence that that has happened at all, and virtually all economists that have looked at that have the consensus that it is a tiny effect, if any effect at all, on wage levels.

i think that is a myth that we need to be more careful about. host: a couple of questions from twitter and e-mail. ralph in kalamazoo, michigan is asking should the snap food program be cut, and by how much? isabel sawhill? guest: there are some savings that can be made in the snap program. there are bills in both houses of congress. enacted the senate has or past has some reasonable cuts in it. on the house side, the cuts that are being proposed are very draconian and should not go forward. right answer to what is the correct amount to spend on food stamps. it comes back to the debate we're having about whether we think that people with very low and a lot of economic

insecurity and difficulty finding work should get some help from the rest of us, and how much help should they get. we will have different views about that, and i think it is good that you are sponsoring this discussion, but i just want to make sure that all sides of the discussion are brought into play here. guest: i think there are two things that need to be done in the food stamp program. the first is that through a number of bureaucratic tricks, the asset rules in food stamps have been removed, so you literally could be somebody with $1 million in the bank and no job and you can get food stamps. not the program was supposed to work that way, and we need to put the asset rules back, because that would save a significant amount of money over time. the second thing is looking to the future, food stamps should not be a one-way handout. food stamps, in the future, should allow able-bodied adults

a at least look for work as result of assistance. there are 4 million able-bodied adults on the program that do not have kids they need to support, and we give them aid and expect nothing back in return. i would like to see that those individuals at least ought to come down and look for work under supervision at least one day, or half a day a week, and what we expect from previous experience is the of -- the unemployment rate will go up, and the number of people receiving aid will go down. whoelps you separate people truly need assistance from those that need a nudge to get back and start to support themselves. i think i would be a good policy and i think the overwhelming majority of americans would agree with that. make surei could just

that everyone understands the current law a right now -- you can have three -- three months of food stamps for every 36 over if youde you lose your job or get sick. reasonable. some states have been able to waive the requirement during the depths of the recession, but it is not as if someone that is able to work and support themselves gets continuous help. waived thetates have program. guest: i understand that, but that was a special -- guest: they waved did before. the key is to make the requirement, that i had to draft, and make it real, and make it a good policy. a policy that exists only on paper does not really do anything. host: minnesota. bob on our line for democrats.

caller: thank you for taking my call. i think it is the wrong thing to to cut downturn economy back as much as they are talking about cutting back on the food stamp program. shouldlieve that people make an attempt to go to work before they get a handout of any kind, but it is affecting a lot of other people, too, that the working poor and the people that cannot find enough work -- a lot of these jobs are part-time and they will not give them full time. if there are any members of the clergy out there listening, you take food out of the mouths of kids, and you are going down the wrong road. if you want to support people that do that, and call yourself i do not see that cutting back at a time like